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A CURRENT REGIME OF UNCERTAINTY: 
IMPROVING ASSESSMENTS OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED 
BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Mousa Alshanteer* 
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) within the healthcare 
industry, especially within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine, is quickly gaining momentum. Courts, however, face 
great difficulty in addressing the question of liability as it pertains 
to such use of AI, specifically due to the inconsistency in the 
distinction between medical device and medical procedure and the 
inconsistency in the application of different standards of care and 
preemption conditions to AI. Courts should adopt a new guiding 
principle and frame the question of liability as it pertains to the use 
of AI within the healthcare industry as one of either medical 
malpractice or product liability, specifically accounting for the 
extent to which AI dictates the course of the healthcare provided to 
patients. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ponder the following: You roll over in your bed, unable to 
muster the strength to arise and seize the day. Lightheaded, you 
reach for the tissues on your nightstand. You then rummage around 
for your iPhone, eventually accessing your home screen and 
navigating to an application dubbed “Your.MD.”1 
The application greets you with a simple message: “Tell me 
about the symptoms you have today.”2 Your thumbs go to work. 
“Fatigue.” “Headache.” “Runny Nose.” Ellipses crop up in the 
bottom left-hand corner of your screen. “How long have you had 
these symptoms for?”3 You continue communicating with that 
which any rational person would presume is a licensed healthcare 
practitioner, ultimately being presented with a list of diagnoses, 
causes, and treatments. 
You do not realize that you have been communicating with a 
chatbot, a form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is increasingly 
being employed by healthcare providers, enabling users to bypass 
initial, in-person visits with their healthcare practitioners, prepare 
 
 1 Your.MD, Your.MD April 2017 Demo, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFzN-3IqPEg [https://perma.cc/9ANA-
C7T3]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
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for follow-up visits and procedures, and maintain observance of 
their individual care plans.4 
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining 
momentum. The federal government, under its Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, has actively supported and 
incentivized the use of AI by awarding grants to healthcare 
providers seeking to employ the technology.5 The U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) recently approved the first use of an 
autonomous AI system by the University of Iowa.6 Federal 
government support and advancements in AI render unsurprising 
the recent finding by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services that the majority of healthcare providers employ some 
form of AI.7 
 
 4 Rachel Z. Arndt, Healthcare Providers are Teaming with Chatbots to Assist 




 5 See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
Health Outcomes Challenge, CMS.GOV (last updated Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence-health-outcomes-
challenge [https://perma.cc/J3VD-ATE5] (announcing receipt by Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services of over three hundred applications for grants 
by innovators seeking to demonstrate how artificial intelligence may be used to 
predict unplanned hospital and skilled nursing facility admissions and adverse 
events). 
 6 Bill Siwicki, University of Iowa Healthcare Rolls Out First Autonomous AI 




 7 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: E-HEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE 3–4 (2016), 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/206751/TelemedicineE-HealthReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZH2G-RPHF] (“[I]t is estimated that sixty-one percent of 
health care institutions currently use some form of telehealth, and between forty 
and fifty percent of all hospitals in the United States currently employ some 
form of telehealth.” (internal citations omitted) Smartphone applications are 
included as forms of telehealth identified by the U.S. Department for Health and 
Human Services). 
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State and federal courts have rarely been presented with the 
question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the 
healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine. The distinction between medical device and medical 
procedure or service limits the theories of liability upon which the 
courts currently rely. If an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to 
constitute a medical device, for instance, the development of the 
platform by the developer is generally subject to product liability 
standards. If, on the other hand, an AI platform is deemed by the 
FDA to constitute a medical procedure or service, the use of the 
platform by the healthcare practitioner is generally subject to 
medical malpractice standards. The standards are substantially 
different. The former provides for strict liability in the absence of 
fault on the part of such developers and practitioners and the 
potential imposition of punitive damages and the latter provides for 
liability only where such developers and practitioners breach their 
duty to act reasonably. Courts therefore face great difficulty in 
addressing the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI 
within the healthcare industry, particularly given the inconsistency 
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure 
or service and the fact that such a distinction limits the theories 
upon which courts currently rely. 
The courts face further difficulty, given the inconsistency in the 
application of existing legislation and regulation to AI platforms 
and, specifically, in the application of different standards of care 
and preemption conditions for such platforms. Some states, for 
instance, require that healthcare practitioners exercise a degree of 
care that the general, nationwide healthcare profession ordinarily 
exercises under the same or similar conditions and circumstances. 
Some other states require that practitioners exercise a degree of 
care that the healthcare profession ordinarily exercises within the 
same community or locality. Others have adopted a hybrid 
standard of care that comprises elements of the national standard 
and the community or locality standard. Such inconsistency is 
rendered much more drastic depending upon the elected approach 
of the FDA in characterizing AI platforms. If the FDA approves an 
AI platform as a medical device subject to its regulations, it partly 
preempts product liability claims against healthcare developers. 
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Alternatively, if it refuses to approve an AI platform as a medical 
device subject to its regulations, the FDA enables individuals to 
bring any liability claims against healthcare developers and 
practitioners, including medical malpractice and product liability 
claims. 
The inconsistencies in the distinction between medical device 
and medical procedure and in the application of different sets of 
legislation and regulation to AI platforms create uncertainty for 
courts, developers of AI platforms, and the healthcare providers 
utilizing such platforms. This uncertainty permeates throughout the 
potential liability of developers and providers, jeopardizing the 
health and safety of patients in the process. 
Such uncertainty may also be abridged by a more uniform 
adoption of existing theories of liability and standards of care by 
courts. With the assistance of federal legislation or administrative 
regulation, promulgated by the FDA, courts should adopt a new 
guiding principle and frame the question of liability as it pertains 
to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, specifically, 
within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine as one of either 
medical malpractice or product liability. 
In deciding between the two theories of liability, courts should 
account for the extent to which AI platforms dictate the course of 
the healthcare provided to patients. In cases of medical 
malpractice, in particular, the standard of care to which such 
platforms will be expected to adhere ought to be that of the 
reasonably prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional 
judgement would have governed in the absence of such platforms. 
Given variation between the different standards of care established 
by the states, as well as the fact that telehealth or telemedicine 
applications of AI enable healthcare services to be provided across 
different states, courts should ultimately assess the standard of care 
to which such applications will be expected to adhere on a national 
basis. Such uniform adoption by the courts may ensure that 
developers and healthcare providers are held more accountable for 
their negligent development and use of AI and may ensure that 
patients are safeguarded. 
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This article will proceed in five parts. Part II will offer a brief 
discussion of the emerging application of AI within the healthcare 
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine. Part III will assess the liability issues raised by such 
an application. Part IV will offer an analysis of the varying theories 
of liability that courts currently rely upon when presented with 
such liability issues. Finally, Part V will offer a recommendation as 
to how courts should adopt a more uniform approach to such 
liability issues and address any pertinent considerations and 
counterarguments. 
II. THE EMERGING APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY THROUGH 
THE LENS OF THE PRACTICE OF TELEHEALTH AND 
TELEMEDICINE 
In a report from its annual meeting held last year, the American 
Medical Association defined AI as “a host of computational 
methods that produce systems that perform tasks normally 
requiring human intelligence. These computational methods 
include, but are not limited to, machine image recognition, natural 
language processing, and machine learning.”8 
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining 
momentum. Healthcare insurance providers, for instance, have 
employed claims review processes that utilize AI to review the 
medical records of individuals and identify those at risk of 
incurring the most substantial costs for healthcare services.9 
Healthcare practitioners have similarly employed clinical decision 
 
 8 Iliana Peters et al., Insight: AI in Health Care – A Look at Critical Data 




 9 See, e.g., Susan Morse, How Health Insurance Companies Use AI to Make 
Consumers Healthier, HEALTHCARE FINANCE (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/how-health-insurance-
companies-use-ai-make-consumers-healthier [https://perma.cc/Q2YJ-8XZX] 
(Prognos, for instance, “uses a lab registry of 18 billion clinical records to 
stratify risk for a group of beneficiaries who have just enrolled.”).  
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support systems that utilize AI to align observations of patients 
with their individualized genetics, medical histories, and symptoms 
as well as generalized population-based healthcare knowledge and, 
thereby, assist the practitioners in improving their decision-making 
at the point of care.10 As an example, Saint Luke’s Health System 
in Kansas City, Missouri, identified that a number of its patients 
transferred from community-based and rural hospitals passed away 
due to not being diagnosed with sepsis early enough.11 Saint 
Luke’s Health System began employing a clinical decision support 
system that assesses the lab work and vital signs records of transfer 
patients pursuant to an algorithm, enabling the transfer team to 
identify transfer patients with sepsis and administer treatment 
thereto, decreasing the mortality rate thereof by thirty percent.12 In 
other contexts, healthcare practitioners have also employed 
software that utilizes AI to recognize their individualized speech 
and vocabulary and automatically create transcriptions of their 
speech, enabling them to more accurately document their sessions 
with patients without expending as much time.13 
Specifically, the use of AI is proliferating within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine, as the amount of AI and healthcare 
practitioners consulting with patients via telecommunications is 
increasing.14 The majority of AI uses within the practice comprise 
 
 10 See, e.g., Bill Siwicki, New Study Identifies Top 11 Clinical Decision 
Support Vendors, HEALTHCAREITNEWS (Oct. 9, 2018), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/new-study-identifies-top-11-clinical-
decision-support-vendors [https://perma.cc/9RHD-NJ2W] (“Seventy-four 
percent of healthcare provider organizations use clinical decision support 
technology, according to a new study from Reaction Data relying on CDS to 
make more informed medication orders (30%), lab orders (24%), medical 
imaging orders (20%), choosing wisely (13%) and other (13%).”).  
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See, e.g., Benjamin Harris, Using Artificial Intelligence, Speech 
Recognition to Optimize Note Taking, HEALTHCAREITNEWS (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/using-artificial-intelligence-speech-
recognition-optimize-note-taking [https://perma.cc/JY3M-Z9Q7]. 
 14 See, e.g., Kumba Sennaar, Artificial Intelligence in Telemedicine and 
Telehealth – 4 Current Applications, EMERJ (Feb. 16, 2019), 
https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-in-telemedicine-
and-telehealth [https://perma.cc/6MUB-KJG7] (“In an effort to increase clinical 
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either diagnostic support or virtual consultation platforms.15 
Diagnostic support is the use of AI to operate chatbots, such as 
those employed by the Your.MD application, that utilize machine 
learning algorithms to recommend a diagnosis to patients based 
upon their individualized genetics, medical histories, and 
symptoms.16 Virtual consultation platforms, on the other hand, 
employ clinical decision support systems, providing for remote 
consultations between healthcare practitioners and their patients 
and utilizing AI to align observations therefrom with the 
individualized genetics, medical histories, and symptoms of the 
patients as well as generalized population-based healthcare 
knowledge.17 The AI utilized by the virtual consultation platform 
analyzes such data and provides recommendations to the 
practitioners, assisting them in improving their decision-making at 
the point of care.18 
HealthTap is one example of a diagnostic support platform 
that, akin to Your.MD, employs chatbots to recommend a 
diagnosis to patients based upon their individualized genetics, 
medical histories, and symptoms.19 The machine learning 
algorithms utilized by the chatbots were developed over a six-year 
period, based upon thousands of questions by patients and answers 
by healthcare practitioners that span 141 medical specialties.20 The 
HealthTap platform has been downloaded over one million times.21 
Remarkably, its chatbots have answered over 2.6 million 
 
and administrative capacity through telehealth, researchers are developing AI-
driven technology for healthcare professionals and consumers.”). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. (Lemonaid Health, a virtual consultation platform, requires patients to 
complete an online health questionnaire, including information on their 
allergies, medications, medical history, and symptoms, and then uses such 
information to match the patient with a healthcare practitioner within two 
minutes.). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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questions.22 AdaHealth, another example of a diagnostic support 
platform, has been downloaded over four million times.23 
InfiniteMD, conversely, is one example of a virtual 
consultation platform that specifically provides for second-opinion 
remote consultations between healthcare practitioners and cancer 
patients. The platform further utilizes AI to align observations 
therefrom with the individualized medical histories of the patients 
as well as generalized clinical trial data and data from other 
consultations conducted through the platform. In doing so, it 
assists the practitioners in recommending particular clinical trials 
for which the patients may be eligible.24 InfiniteMD claims that 
twenty-eight percent of its consultations resulted in a change or 
correction in diagnosis, and that over seventy-two percent of its 
consultations resulted in a revised treatment plan.25 Lemonaid 
Health, another example of a virtual consultation platform, has 
processed over 48,000 consultations across fourteen states in just 
over two years.26 
The use of AI within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine 
is accompanied by reductions in healthcare expenditures by 
healthcare insurers and providers as well as patients.27 One review 
 
 22 See HealthTap, GOOGLE PLAY (Jan. 30, 2020), 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.healthtap.userhtexpress&hl=e
nUS [https://perma.cc/79WJ-T5C2] (“Search content from over 2.6 million 
doctor-answered questions and 700,000 topics and articles across over 850 
conditions.”).  
 23 See Sennaar, supra note 14. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Justine Hofherr, The Doctor is in: How InfiniteMD Plans on Using AI to 
Give Patients Second Opinions, BUILTINBOSTON (Feb. 9, 2018), 
https://www.builtinboston.com/2018/02/09/how-infinitemd-using-ai-give-
patients-second-opinions [https://perma.cc/94KM-LZK6]. 
 26 Antoinette Siu, John Muir Expands Care With $25 Telemedicine Visits, S.F. 
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.johnmuirhealth.com/about-john-muir-
health/press-room/Press-releases/2017-8-14-john-muir-health-expands-care-
with-telemedicine.html [https://perma.cc/YET4-USCS]. 
 27 See, e.g., Am. Telemedicine Ass’n., Examples of Research Outcomes: 
Telemedicine’s Impact on Healthcare Cost and Quality 1, AM. TELEMEDICINE 
ASS’N (Apr. 2013), https://www.amdtelemedicine.com/telemedicine-
resources/documents/ATATelemedicineResearchPaper_impact-on-healthcare-
cost-and-quality_April2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BNV-9Y5B] (“[S]tudies are 
36 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 27 
of twenty-three different telehealth or telemedicine applications of 
AI between 1997 and 2007, for instance, demonstrated reductions 
in total cost, cost per patient, and cost per visit.28 Additionally, the 
American Telemedicine Association notes that “for most 
telemedicine applications, studies have shown that there is no 
difference in the ability of the provider to obtain clinical 
information, make an accurate diagnosis, and develop a treatment 
plan that produces the same desired clinical outcomes as compared 
to in-person care when used appropriately.”29 One review of 
twenty-nine different telehealth or telemedicine applications of AI 
between 2001 and 2007 demonstrated a moderate, positive, and 
significant effect on clinical outcomes, particularly for 
cardiovascular and psychiatric conditions.30 Indeed, “using mobile 
health to eliminate preventable human errors and promote 
evidence-based decision-making would seem to increase the 
quality of healthcare.”31 Furthermore, patient satisfaction with the 
use of AI in the practice of telehealth or telemedicine has 
consistently been very high.32 One examination that accounted for 
differences in patient age, education, gender, income, insurance, 
and race unearthed an overall patient satisfaction of 98.3%.33 In 
strong contrast, one examination of patient satisfaction with their 
human healthcare providers, particularly among cardiovascular 
patients, unearthed an overall patient satisfaction of 76.5%.34 
 
consistent in finding that telemedicine saves the patients, providers and payers 
money when compared with traditional approaches to providing care.”).  
 28 Id. at 3. 
 29 Id. at 4. 
 30 Id. at 5. 
 31 Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal 
Storm Over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 26 
HEALTH MATRIX 123, 129 (2016). 
 32 AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N., supra note 27, at 6. 
 33 Id. (stating the examination in question, while reported by the American 
Telemedicine Association, was conducted independently, by Susan S. Gustke, 
David C. Balch, Vivian L. West, and Lance O. Rogers). 
 34 Mohd Noor Norhayati et al., Patient Satisfaction with Doctor-Patient 
Interaction and its Association with Modifiable Cardiovascular Risk Factors 
Among Moderately-High Risk Patients in Primary Healthcare, 5 PEERJ (2017). 
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Nonetheless, the expanding use of AI within the healthcare 
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine is also accompanied by surprisingly under-analyzed 
issues of fraud and abuse, insurance coverage and reimbursement, 
information privacy and security, licensure, and liability.35 For 
instance, federal legislation on such use has predominately 
addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement.36 The Creating 
High-Quality Results and Outcomes Necessary to Improve 
Chronic Care Act of 2017, for instance, expanded Medicare 
coverage and reimbursement to some telehealth or telemedicine 
applications of AI.37 State legislation on such use has 
predominately addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement.38 
In 2017, for instance, sixty-two pieces of state legislation were 
introduced in the legislatures of thirty-four states, most of which 
predominately addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement.39 
Liability, in particular, has not been thoroughly addressed, leaving 
unanswered questions regarding the attribution and evaluation of 
responsibility for any injuries suffered by patients as a result of the 
use of AI. 
III. LIABILITY ISSUES RAISED BY THE EMERGING 
APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN 
TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE 
The use of novel medical technologies within the healthcare 
industry often brings about a reconceptualization of medical 
liability, raising questions as to the applicability of various 
standards of care and the identification of the responsible party for 
negligence or wrongdoing. Artificial intelligence is no different. It 
 
 35 See generally Mei Kwong, Special Issue: What will 2018 Bring for 
Telehealth Policy?, CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y (Jan. 2, 2017), 
https://mailchi.mp/cchpca/special-issue-what-will-2018-bring-for-telehealth-
policy [https://perma.cc/89FK-QJHZ]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See generally Creating High-Quality Results and Outcomes Necessary to 
Improve Chronic (CHRONIC) Care Act of 2017, S.870, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 38 See Kwong, supra note 35. (“The most frequently addressed issues in state 
legislation were public and private payer reimbursement.”). 
 39 See id. 
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is unique, however, in the issues it raises in the attribution and 
evaluation of responsibility for any injuries suffered by patients as 
a result of its use, particularly within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine. For the first time, the observations and 
recommendations of AI could depose the professional judgements 
of rigorously trained healthcare practitioners.40 
Researchers at Stanford University recently developed an AI 
platform that analyzed more than 100,000 chest X-rays made 
publicly available by the National Institutes of Health, compared 
the X-rays to those of HIV-positive patients in South Africa, and 
demonstrated an ability to correctly diagnose tuberculosis among 
such patients at a rate thirteen percent higher than healthcare 
practitioners therein.41 Researchers at Google similarly developed 
an AI platform that analyzed a small subset of images of diabetic 
retinopathy adjudicated by ophthalmologists that specialize in 
retinal diseases and demonstrated an ability to adjudicate the 
images of moderate or significant diabetic retinopathy on its own 
at an accuracy of ninety-seven percent as compared to the accuracy 
of eighty-four percent at which the ophthalmologists adjudicated 
the images.42 Researchers at Google and Stanford have thus 
developed AI platforms that have accurately and constructively 
deposed the professional judgements of healthcare practitioners. 
Nonetheless, AI platforms are predisposed to certain biases that 
healthcare practitioners may be better equipped to manage. For 
instance, one hospital system used an AI platform to determine 
whether its pneumonia patients would respond better to in-home 
treatment than to treatment at the hospital system. In doing so, the 
hospital system subjected itself to the biases inherent to the 
 
 40 See Gary E. Marchant & Lucille M. Tournas, AI Health Care Liability: 
From Research Trials to Court Trials, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 23, 26 (2019). 
 41 Richard Harris, How Can Doctors be Sure a Self-Taught Computer is 




 42 Laura Lovett, Google Researchers Find Trained AI Detects Diabetic 
Retinopathy on Par with Experts, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/google-researchers-find-trained-ai-
detects-diabetic-retinopathy-par-experts [https://perma.cc/XU9H-MZ7C]. 
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underlying data and reasoning mechanisms employed by the AI.43 
The platform determined that asthmatic pneumonia patients would 
respond better to in-home treatment based upon data demonstrating 
that such patients achieved better outcomes than non-asthmatic 
pneumonia patients when admitted to, and treated at, the hospital 
system.44 However, such data was indicative of asthmatic 
pneumonia patients normally being admitted to acute care units, 
where they receive immediate and focused treatment, due to their 
being at a greater risk than non-asthmatic pneumonia patients.45 
Similarly, the AI platform developed by the researchers at 
Stanford University was also subject to biases, recognizing in its 
analysis and comparison of X-rays information around the edge of 
the images that demonstrated the type of X-ray machine through 
which the images were transmitted.46 After detecting that a 
portable X-ray machine had been used, the platform was more 
likely to diagnose the HIV-positive patients with tuberculosis, 
since such machines are more frequently used in hospitals and 
pneumonia is more common amongst hospitalized patients than 
amongst those who opt for office visits with their healthcare 
practitioners, demonstrating that AI platforms are predisposed to 
certain biases that healthcare practitioners may be better able to 
account for.47 “It was being a good machine-learning model and it 
was aggressively using all available information baked into the 
image to make its recommendations,” said one of the researchers 
who developed the platform.48 Even that, however, was not 
enough. 
Artificial intelligence, as employed within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine, is no less predisposed to such biases. 
For instance, Doctor Hazel, a virtual consultation platform, utilizes 
 
 43 Rich Caruana et al., Intelligible Models for HealthCare: Predicting 
Pneumonia Risk and Hospital 30-Day Readmission, KD’15 PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 1721 (2015). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Harris, supra note 41. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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AI to determine whether photographs of moles uploaded by its 
users are benign or potentially cancerous.49 Doctor Hazel, however, 
is predisposed to a sampling bias due to the minute amount of data 
being analyzed and compared by the AI it utilizes.50 The platform 
reports its having correctly determined moles to be potentially 
cancerous at a rate of eighty-five percent, demonstrating that there 
exists substantial potential for its reporting of false negatives, 
where users are told that their moles are benign when, in fact, they 
are potentially cancerous.51 
A healthcare practitioner may better account for such biases, 
demonstrating that the observations and recommendations of AI 
perhaps ought not to so readily depose the professional judgments 
of such practitioners. An overreliance on AI and its inherent biases 
may nonetheless pose significant risks, particularly of 
misdiagnoses, especially to those patients who seek to bypass in-
person visits with their healthcare practitioners, prepare for follow-
up visits and procedures, and maintain observance of their 
individual care plans by means of applications of telehealth or 
telemedicine. Accordingly, there exists, note researchers, “a 
significant and growing liability exposure for health care 
providers, product manufacturers, and health care institutions, 
given the uncertainties created about whether, how, and when AI 
should be measured, if at all, by traditional notions of the standard 
of care.”52 
 
 49 Dave Muoio, Doctor Hazel, an AI Aimed at Skin Cancer Detection, is 
Latest in a Long Line, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/doctor-hazel-ai-aimed-skin-cancer-
detection-latest-long-line [https://perma.cc/U4SQ-VZCM]. 
 50 Sarah Buhr, Doctor Hazel Uses AI to Try to Determine if you Have Skin 
Cancer, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 17, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/17/ 
doctor-hazel-uses-ai-to-try-to-determine-if-you-have-skin-cancer/ 
[https://perma.cc/6MVX-4X8S] (“The main hurdle right now is getting the data 
needed to help Doctor Hazel predict skin cancer with at least a ninety percent 
accuracy. ‘There’s a huge problem in getting AI data for medicine. It’s painful 
to get the data, even from large institutions. No one wants to share . . . [b]ut 
amazing results are possible. The more people share, the more accurate the 
system becomes.’”).  
 51 Muoio, supra note 49. 
 52 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 23. 
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Furthermore, the rapid emergence of the application of AI 
within the healthcare industry, particularly within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine, may result in some applications beyond 
the comprehension of some healthcare practitioners as well as an 
inability of clinical guidelines and clinical support systems to keep 
pace.53 “As technologies change so rapidly,” explain Marchant and 
Tournas, “what might be malpractice if relied on today may be 
negligent to not use tomorrow.”54 Despite its quickly gaining 
momentum, state and federal courts have rarely been presented 
with the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within 
the healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine.55 
IV. APPROACHES COURTS MAY TAKE WHEN FACED WITH 
TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE LIABILITY ISSUES 
When presented with the question of liability as it pertains to 
the use of AI within the healthcare industry, the courts may 
theoretically rely upon such varying theories of liability as medical 
malpractice and product liability and, in cases of medical 
malpractice, different standards of care. In doing so, the courts 
create uncertainty for the developers of AI platforms and the 
healthcare providers utilizing such platforms as to their potential 
liability, jeopardizing the health and safety of patients in the 
process. Indeed, “[n]o courts have yet had the opportunity to 
address” the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI 
within the healthcare industry.56 
 
 53 Id. at 34. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 33. 
 56 Id. at 40; see also W. Nicholson Price II et al., Potential Liability for 
Physicians Using Artificial Intelligence, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Oct. 4, 2019), 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2752750 
[https://perma.cc/45K2-BFAJ] (“In part because AI is so new to clinical 
practice, there is essentially no case law on liability involving medical AI.”).  
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A. The Inconsistency in the Distinction Between Medical Device 
and Medical Procedure or Service and the Effect of Such 
Distinction Upon Theories of Liability 
Courts face great difficulty in addressing the question of 
liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare 
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine. This difficulty is made more drastic as 
administrative, legislative, and judicial bodies have yet to address 
whether AI constitutes a medical device or, rather, a medical 
procedure or service.57 The distinction between medical device and 
medical procedure or service limits the theories upon which the 
courts currently rely when presented with questions of liability as it 
pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, 
specifically, within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine. 
Liability for uses of AI within the healthcare industry may be 
evaluated under either the traditional product liability standards for 
manufactured products or under the commonplace medical 
malpractice liability standards for healthcare practitioners.58 The 
medical malpractice liability standards for healthcare practitioners 
and the product liability standards for manufactured products are 
substantially different. 
In alleging product liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
(1) his or her injury resulted from a product defect that rendered 
the product unreasonably dangerous, and (2) the defect existed at 
the time the product left the developer.59 Product liability relies 
 
 57 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 32. 
 58 Id. at 26. 
 59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 
1998); see also Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The 
Medical Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence 
Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2013). The requirement that the plaintiff 
demonstrate the existence of a defect at the time the product left the developer 
raises interesting questions for developers of artificial intelligence platforms and 
the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms. Because artificial 
intelligence platforms sometimes utilize machine learning, whereby the 
platforms automatically learn and improve from experience, defects may arise 
that did not exist at the time the platform left the developer. The question 
remains as to whether such defects may expose developers and practitioners to 
liability. Similarly, the question remains as to whether biases in the platform’s 
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upon a more plaintiff-friendly, strict liability standard for design 
defects, manufacturing defects, and warning defects in 
manufactured products, enabling plaintiffs to prevail even in the 
absence of fault or intent on the part of the defendant.60 Further, 
product liability doctrine provides for punitive damages.61 
On the other hand, in alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate that (1) the defendant healthcare practitioner 
owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached such duty, 
and (3) the breach of such duty proximately caused injury to the 
plaintiff.62 Medical malpractice relies upon a more defendant-
friendly, negligence standard, enabling plaintiffs to prevail only if 
they demonstrate that defendants breached their duty to act as 
reasonably prudent healthcare practitioners, often by means of the 
expert testimony of other similarly situated practitioners.63 Medical 
malpractice doctrine, in contrast to product liability doctrine, 
provides for a statutorily defined amount of damages.64 
If an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to constitute a medical 
device, the development of the platform by the developer is 
generally subject to product liability standards.65 If the FDA deems 
an AI platform to constitute a medical device, the availability of 
product liability as a claim may be limited. Traditionally, for 
instance, hospitals and healthcare practitioners have been rendered 
immune from product liability actions arising out of the use of 
medical devices because courts have held the primary function of 
hospitals and practitioners to be the provision of medical 
procedures or services rather than medical devices.66 Further, the 
learned intermediary doctrine may prevent the plaintiff from 
bringing such a product liability action against the developer of the 
 
decision-making that result from its learning of data constitute defects that may 
expose developers and practitioners to liability. 
 60 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 26. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See 6 MED. MALPRAC. CHKLSTS. & DISC. § 47:15 (2019); see also Laura 
E.A. Wibberley, Telemedicine in Illinois: Untangling the Complex Legal 
Threads, 50 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2017). 
 63 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 26. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 33. 
 66 Allain, supra note 59, at 1067. 
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product if the developer satisfied his duty to warn users of the 
potential dangers inherent in the use of the product.67 On the other 
hand, if an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to constitute a 
medical procedure or service, the use of the platform by the 
healthcare practitioner is generally subject to medical malpractice 
standards.68 
The FDA has approved some AI platforms as medical devices 
while refusing to approve other platforms as such, instead 
apparently accepting them as medical procedures or services.69 For 
example, the FDA approved the AI platform developed and 
utilized by researchers at Google to detect diabetic retinopathy as a 
medical device.70 A similar platform developed and utilized by 
researchers at IBM, however, is accepted as a medical procedure or 
service, utilized by healthcare practitioners without having 
undergone approval or oversight by the FDA.71 In approving some 
AI platforms as medical devices while refusing to approve other 
platforms as such, the FDA subjects the developers of similar 
platforms and the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms 
to substantially different standards, one that provides for strict 
liability in the absence of fault on the part of such developers and 
practitioners and the potential imposition of punitive damages, and 
another that provides for liability only if such developers and 
practitioners breach their duty to act reasonably. 
The consequences of developers of AI platforms or the 
healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms being subjected to 
different standards of product liability or medical malpractice may 
be demonstrated by a hypothetical application of medical 
malpractice standards to the factual scenario presented in Taylor v. 
 
 67 Id. 
 68 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 33. 
 69 Id. at 32. 
 70 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial 
Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems, 
FDA.GOV (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-
announcements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-device-
detect-certain-diabetes-related-eye [https://perma.cc/PAS4-EU7B]. 
 71 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 32. 
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Intuitive Surgical.72 The factual scenario in Taylor demonstrated an 
ambiguity as to whether an AI platform or the healthcare 
practitioner operating such a platform was culpable for the harm 
suffered by the plaintiff.73 
In Taylor, the plaintiff brought a product liability claim against 
the manufacturer of a robotic surgical system that utilized AI for 
injuries sustained by a patient who had been operated upon by the 
system, even when the surgeon operating the system may have 
been more responsible for the errors that caused the injuries than 
the manufacturer.74 The surgeon was trained and credentialed to 
operate the system.75 As part of his training, the surgeon received a 
manual that recommended that the maximum body mass index for 
candidates eligible for operation be set at thirty.76 Nonetheless, the 
patient who had been operated upon presented to the surgeon with 
a body mass index of thirty-nine.77 The patient suffered from 
severe complications throughout the surgery and thereafter 
required assistance with ambulating and breathing, eventually 
passing away within four years after his having been operated on.78 
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s decision 
finding for the manufacturer, holding that the manufacturer 
provided adequate warning to the surgeon and, thereby, satisfied 
its duty to provide a warning regarding the nature of the system it 
had developed.79 
Alternatively, had the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice 
claim against the surgeon operating the system, the jury may have 
decided for the plaintiff, especially since the decision by the 
surgeon to operate on a patient who presented with a body mass 
index of thirty-nine, in contravention of the recommendation that 
the maximum body mass index for candidates eligible for 
 
 72 Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 355 P.3d 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015), aff’g 
Case No. 09-2-03136-5 (Wash. Superior Ct. 2013). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 312. 
 75 Id. at 311. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 312. 
 79 Id. 
46 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 21: 27 
operation be set at thirty, may constitute a breach of the duty of the 
surgeon to exercise reasonable care. Thus, the potential 
determination by the FDA that the system either constitutes a 
medical device or a medical procedure or service may have 
foreclosed the plaintiff from bringing particular claims or relying 
upon particular standards, each of which provide for different 
assessments of fault and damages. Accordingly, the inconsistency 
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure 
or service creates uncertainty not only for courts but, also, for the 
developers of AI platforms and the healthcare providers utilizing 
such platforms as to the potential liability of developers and 
providers, jeopardizing the health and safety of patients in the 
process. 
B. The Inconsistency in the Application of Different Sets of 
Legislation and Regulation and the Effect of Such Application 
Upon Applicable Standards of Care and Preemption 
Conditions 
The courts face further difficulty in addressing the question of 
liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare 
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine, because medical devices and medical procedures or 
services are subject to different sets of legislation and regulation. 
The federal government is tasked with legislating, and the FDA is 
tasked with regulating, medical products.80 State governments, on 
the other hand, are tasked with legislating and regulating the 
practice of medicine, including medical procedures or services.81 
 
 80 See Bill Sutton, Overview of Regulatory Requirements: Medical Devices – 
Transcript, FDA.GOV (Nov. 2011), https://www.fda.gov/training-and-
continuing-education/cdrh-learn/overview-regulatory-requirements-medical-
devices-transcript [https://perma.cc/KQ2R-JDBY] (“The US Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) is responsible for regulating and supervising the safety of 
foods, dietary supplements, drugs, vaccine, biological medical products, blood 
products, medical devices, radiation-emitting products, veterinary products, and 
cosmetics.”).  
 81 See generally Richard Epstein, Government Regulation of the Practice of 
Medicine: How the FDA Overreaches the Regulation of Medical Practice, 
HARV. L. SCH.: BILL OF HEALTH (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/30/government-regulation-of-
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Such legislation and regulation render more difficult analyses 
of questions of liability raised by applications of AI within the 
healthcare industry, especially considering that such legislation and 
regulation establish different standards of care to which healthcare 
developers and practitioners are expected to adhere. Twenty-nine 
states, for instance, require the same standard of care for telehealth 
or telemedicine applications of AI as is required for traditional, in-
person visits with healthcare practitioners.82 “The issue is that the 
standards of care for traditional in-person encounters vary by 
state.”83 
In Georgia, for instance, healthcare practitioners must exercise 
a reasonable degree of care, interpreted to encompass the degree of 
care that the general, nationwide healthcare profession ordinarily 
exercises under the same or similar conditions and circumstances, 
attested to by an expert witness.84 Other states, such as Idaho and 
Washington, require the degree of care ordinarily exercised under 
the same or similar conditions to account for care ordinarily 
exercised within the same community or locality.85 A standard of 
care that accounts for community or locality generally requires that 
the expert witness attesting to the standard hail from the same 
community or locality as the defendant and compare the care 
provided by the defendant to the applicable standard in the 
community or locality within which the care was provided.86 
Standards of care, however, are still subject to state-by-state 
variations in the geographic scope of the applicable community or 




 82 Adelyn B. Boleman, Comment, Georgia’s Telemedicine Laws and 
Regulations: Protecting Against Health Care Access, 68 MERCER L. REV. 489, 
507 (2017) (stating the standard of care established within the states wherein the 
patient is seen governs). 
 83 Id. at 508. 
 84 See Smith v. Finch, 681 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. 2009); see also Kapsch v. 
Stowers, 434 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. 1993) (holding Georgia has already 
embraced the national standard of care to good effect). 
 85 See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1012 (1976); see also Wash. Rev. Code 
Ann. § 7.70.040(1) (2011). 
 86 See, e.g., Sheeley v. Mem’l Hosp., 710 A.2d 161, 165–66 (R.I. 1998). 
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locality to the geographic area typically served by the hospital, but 
if no such hospital exists, a geographic area similar to that within 
which the care was provided may constitute the applicable 
locality.87 Washington, on the other hand, expands the applicable 
community or locality to the entire state of Washington.88 Other 
states, such as Louisiana, have adopted a hybrid standard of care, 
which comprises elements of the national standard adopted by 
Georgia and the community or locality standards adopted by Idaho 
and Washington.89 Specifically, hybrid states require that 
specialists abide by the national standard and that general 
practitioners abide by the community or locality standard.90 
Such inconsistent legislation and regulation render analyses of 
liability raised by applications of AI within the healthcare industry 
more complex, especially considering that this legislation and 
regulation subject applications of AI to different preemption 
conditions.91 Indeed, when the FDA approves an AI platform as a 
medical device subject to FDA regulations, the FDA partly 
preempts product liability claims against healthcare developers.92 
Alternatively, when the FDA refuses to approve an AI platform as 
a medical device subject to FDA regulations because use of the 
platform constitutes the practice of medicine, individuals may 
bring liability claims against healthcare developers and 
practitioners, including medical malpractice and product liability 
claims.93 Such inconsistency in the application of different sets of 
legislation and regulation—and, specifically, in the application of 
different standards of care and preemption conditions—may 
 
 87 Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1012. 
 88 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.040(1). 
 89 See, e.g., Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1137–38 (La. Ct. 
App. 1981), writ denied, 404 So. 2d 277 (La. 1981) (Specialists are “subject to 
the higher standard of care ordinarily practiced by physicians within that 
particular specialty rather than the standard of care exercised by generalist 
physicians practicing in the same community. The locality factor is no longer 
involved in determining the standard of care required of specialists in 
malpractice suits.”). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 33. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
MAY 2020] Improving Assessments of Liability 49 
further create additional uncertainty for courts, developers of AI 
platforms, and healthcare providers utilizing such platforms as to 
the potential liability of developers and providers. In doing so, this 
inconsistency may further jeopardize the health and safety of 
patients. 
Indeed, because of the inconsistency in the establishment of 
different standards of care, “the ‘safest’ way to use medical 
[artificial intelligence] from a liability perspective is as a 
confirmatory tool to support existing decision-making processes 
rather than as a source of ways to improve care.”94 Even where AI 
platforms provide for more accurate assessments of patient 
conditions, such as the platform developed by Stanford researchers 
which correctly diagnosed tuberculosis among patients at a higher 
rate than healthcare practitioners, the inconsistency in the 
establishment of different standards of care incentivizes 
practitioners to reject such assessments out of fear that their 
accepting may fall short of the degree of care exercised by 
practitioners nationally or those within the same community or 
locality.95 “Without legislation enacted specifically to 
accommodate this new technology or sufficient case law to 
establish precedent on the legal issues raised, courts are forced to 
analogize new technologies to previous ones for which laws 
exist.”96 
Thus, when faced with the question of liability as it pertains to 
the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, specifically, 
within the practices of telehealth or telemedicine, courts ought to 
reestablish the demarcation between medical malpractice liability 
and product liability, clarifying for healthcare developers and 
practitioners the standards to which they will be expected to adhere 
and safeguarding patients in the process. The predicament at hand 
has been summarized as follows: 
If the machine is evaluated under a different standard than the human 
doctor who it replaces in performing a specific task, this discrepancy 
 
 94 Price II et al., supra note 56. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of Incorporating 
Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 90, 116 
(2012). 
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may bias the outcome of a head-to-head competition between human 
and machine. Imposing a higher standard on the AI machine may 
deprive patients of better care and could deprive the health system of 
potential cost savings provided by an AI system. On the other hand, 
imposing a lower standard of care on the AI machine may encourage 
the offering of substandard care.97 
In other words, the ambiguity in the standards to which 
healthcare developers and practitioners are expected to adhere 
jeopardizes the health and safety of patients, rendering a 
clarification by the courts much more necessary. 
V. A RECOMMENDATION AS TO HOW THE COURTS OUGHT 
TO MODIFY THEIR APPROACH WHEN FACED WITH SUCH 
LIABILITY ISSUES 
Such a predicament may be abridged by a more uniform 
adoption of existing theories of liability and standards of care by 
the courts. With the assistance of federal legislation or 
administrative regulation, perhaps promulgated by the FDA, courts 
could and ought to adopt a new guiding principle. Further, courts 
should frame the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI 
within the healthcare industry and, specifically, within the practice 
of telehealth or telemedicine as one of either medical malpractice 
or product liability. In deciding between the two theories of 
liability, the courts should account for the extent to which AI 
platforms dictate the course of the healthcare provided to 
patients.98 
For instance, if AI platforms completely depose the 
professional judgment of healthcare practitioners and if they err in 
their observations or recommendations based upon their internal 
machine learning mechanisms, they should be held to malpractice 
liability standards.99 The standard of care to which such platforms 
will be expected to adhere ought to be that of the reasonably 
prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional judgment would 
have governed in the absence of such platforms. Some states, 
including Colorado and Mississippi, have established the standard 
 
 97 Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 38–39. 
 98 Id. at 39. 
 99 Id. 
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of care to which such platforms will be expected to adhere as that 
of the reasonably prudent healthcare practitioner whose 
professional judgment would have governed in the absence of such 
platforms.100 Twenty-nine medical boards, including that of 
Georgia, have also established a similar standard of care.101 Given 
variation between the different standards of care established by the 
states, as well as the fact that telehealth or telemedicine 
applications of AI enable healthcare services to be provided across 
different states, courts should hold the standard of care to which 
such applications will be expected to adhere on a national basis. 
The standard of care should be that of the general, reasonably 
prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional judgment would 
have governed in the absence of such platforms, without 
accounting for community or local variation.102 Such applications 
would, therefore, be held to the same standard, regardless of the 
physical location of either the healthcare practitioner or his or her 
patient.103 
Undeniably, some cases may arise in which AI platforms err in 
their observations or recommendations based upon their internal 
learning mechanisms as well as defects in their design, 
manufacture, or warnings. In such cases, the decision between the 
two theories of liability ought to be dependent upon whether 
internal learning mechanisms or defects in design, manufacture, or 
warning are more responsible for the harm suffered by the patient. 
Where the AI platforms err in their observations or 
recommendations based upon defects in their design, manufacture, 
or warnings, they ought to be held to product liability standards. 
In modifying their approach to the question of liability as it 
pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, 
specifically, within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine, the 
 
 100 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-16-123(2) (2016) (“Any health 
benefits provided through telemedicine shall meet the same standard of care as 
for in-person care.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 83-9-353(2) (2014) (“Treatment 
recommendations made via electronic means shall be held to the same standards 
of appropriate practice as those in traditional provider-patient setting.”). 
 101 Boleman, supra note 82, at 507. 
 102 Id. at 517. 
 103 Id. 
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courts may address the very issues arising from the inconsistency 
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure 
or service and the fact that such a distinction limits the theories 
upon which the courts currently rely. By accounting for the extent 
to which AI platforms dictate the course of the healthcare provided 
to patients, rather than whether the platforms are deemed to be 
medical devices or medical procedures or services, courts may 
subject developers of similar AI platforms and healthcare 
practitioners utilizing such platforms to the same standards. In 
doing so, courts may provide clarity for developers and 
practitioners as to their potential liability and safeguard the health 
and safety of patients in the process. 
In modifying their approach, courts may also address the very 
issues arising from the inconsistency in the application of different 
sets of legislation and regulation to AI platforms and, specifically, 
in the application of different standards of care and preemption 
conditions for such platforms. By assessing the standard of care to 
which these platforms will be expected to adhere on a national 
basis—as that of the general, reasonably prudent healthcare 
practitioner whose professional judgment would have governed in 
the absence of such platforms, without account for community or 
local variation—courts may subject the developers of AI platforms 
and the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms to the 
same, singular standard of care, despite community or local 
variation in the development, marketing, sale, and utilization of 
these platforms. In doing so, the courts may ensure fairness for the 
various developers, healthcare practitioners, and the patients that 
are developing, utilizing, and being subjected to such platforms. 
The courts may, further, provide clarity for developers and 
practitioners as to their potential liability, regardless of whether an 
AI platform or a practitioner erred in the healthcare provided to the 
patient, and safeguard the health and safety of patients in the 
process. 
Again, the use of AI within the practice of telehealth or 
telemedicine has demonstrated significant benefits. For example, 
use of AI technology has been accompanied by reductions in 
healthcare expenditures by healthcare insurers and providers. 
Additionally, patients have seen positive effects on clinical 
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outcomes, and AI technology has increased patient satisfaction, 
despite differences in patient age, education, gender, income, 
insurance, and race.104 Thus, in modifying their approach to the 
question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the 
healthcare industry and, specifically, within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine, courts should remain cognizant of such 
benefits, careful not to deter developers from developing 
innovative AI platforms. Indeed, “the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industries often rail against the obstructionism of the federal 
government towards new medical technologies.”105 This modified 
approach, however, remains sensitive to such concerns, allowing 
for safeguards that aim to ensure that developers are not deterred 
from developing innovative AI platforms. 
For instance, one safeguard may be the introduction of a 
legislative or regulatory requirement that healthcare practitioners 
meaningfully review the observations or recommendations of AI 
platforms, thereby reducing liability exposure where such 
platforms err in their observations or recommendations based upon 
their internal machine learning mechanisms or defects in their 
design, manufacture, or warnings.106 “Freezing the standard of care 
to require meaningful human participation would head off [the] 
consequences [of liability],” notes Froomkin.107 
Nonetheless, any legislative or regulatory requirement that 
healthcare practitioners “meaningfully” review the observations or 
recommendations of AI platforms may be difficult to implement. 
For instance, the determination of the extent to which practitioners 
are required to review the observations or recommendations of AI 
platforms, may be complicated by the fact that the capabilities of 
AI platforms are continually being enhanced.108 “In the abstract, 
 
 104 Am. Telemedicine Ass’n., supra note 27, at 1–6. 
 105 Khan, supra note 31, at 142. 
 106 A Michael Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting 
the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. 
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however, it is very hard to define the appropriate level of review 
with any precision.”109 
Accordingly, the extent to which practitioners will be required 
to review the observations or recommendations of AI platforms 
may need to be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than 
subjected to a firm standard.110 Any legislative or regulatory 
requirement that healthcare practitioners meaningfully review the 
observations or recommendations of AI platforms may invite more 
inefficiency in healthcare decision-making.111 Moreover, and 
relatedly, any legislative or regulatory requirement that healthcare 
practitioners meaningfully review observations or 
recommendations of AI platforms, may be incredibly costly to 
healthcare practitioners and their patients.112 Indeed, such a 
requirement may risk “forgoing a larger number of beneficial 
outcomes that will not happen because the [artificial intelligence] 
plus physician is too expensive. The risk here is that some people 
may not be able to afford the care that they otherwise might have 
had.”113 
Another safeguard that aims to ensure that developers are not 
deterred from developing innovative AI platforms may be the 
introduction of some arrangement of “enterprise liability” in which 
developers of AI platforms, healthcare practitioners, or hospitals 
utilizing such platforms pay the federal government an excise tax 
for their development or utilization of such platforms.114 This 
enables the federal government to establish a compensation 
program for patients injured as a result of such development or 
utilization.115 The healthcare industry is well-suited for the theory 
of enterprise liability because (1) the industry can reasonably 
expect and insure against the potential injuries that may be caused 
by AI platforms after consideration of its past experiences with 
such platforms and resulting clinical outcomes; (2) the industry is 
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well-equipped to develop and implement quality assurance 
programs that can mitigate the potential for injuries that may be 
caused by such platforms; and (3) the industry stands in the best 
financial position to distribute and sustain the losses that may be 
caused by such platforms.116 
One arrangement of enterprise liability that may serve as a 
model is the Vaccine Compensation Program, established by the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.117 The Act enabled prompt 
and adequate “compensation to be paid for vaccine-related injury 
or death” while maintaining the “nation’s supply of vaccines by 
insulating manufacturers from liability.”118 The Program requires 
that an excise tax be placed on every vaccine dose administered 
and that patients injured by vaccines “bring their claims in the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims before seeking other remedies against” 
developers of vaccines or healthcare practitioners administering 
such vaccines.119 An arrangement similar to the Vaccine 
Compensation Program may “[impose] the burdens ensuring the 
safety of [AI] technologies on the healthcare industry as a whole, 
thereby relieving individual physicians [and developers] from 
liability for technology’s few but inevitable failures.”120 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining 
momentum. The state and federal effort to contain the spread of the 
novel Coronavirus, for instance, has resulted in an increase in the 
use of AI within the healthcare industry, especially within the 
practice of telehealth or telemedicine, as state and federal 
governments have relaxed regulations governing the use thereof.121 
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 121 See Jennifer Kay, Florida Providing Free Telehealth, Flu Shots for State 
Employees, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ 
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On March 26, 2020, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed an 
executive order requiring the State Group Insurance Program, 
which provides coverage to state employees and their dependents, 
to include within its coverage telehealth or telemedicine services at 
no additional cost to beneficiaries.122 Similarly, on March 6, 2020, 
President Donald Trump signed into law the Coronavirus 
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
enabling the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to 
expand coverage of telehealth or telemedicine services to all 
Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of their location.123 
State and federal courts, however, have rarely been presented 
with the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within 
the healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of 
telehealth or telemedicine. The courts face great difficulty in 
addressing such a question of liability, particularly given the 
inconsistencies in the distinction between medical device and 
medical procedure or service and in the application of different sets 
of legislation and regulation to AI platforms. 
Such inconsistencies create uncertainty not only for the courts 
but, also, for the developers of AI platforms and the healthcare 
providers utilizing such platforms as to the potential liability of 
developers and providers, jeopardizing the health and safety of 
patients in the process. This uncertainty may be abridged by a 
more uniform adoption of existing theories of liability and 
standards of care by the courts. With the assistance of federal 
legislation or administrative regulation, perhaps promulgated by 
the FDA, courts ought to adopt a new guiding principle and frame 
the question of liability as one of either medical malpractice or 
 
Copayments Leave Unanswered Questions, BLOOMBERG L. (March 27, 2020), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insights-waived-
medicare-telehealth-copayments-leave-unanswered-questions 
[https://perma.cc/9WFW-QWEG] (federal government response). 
 122 See Kay, supra note 121. 
 123 See Anjali N.C. Downs et al., Insight: Key Medicare Telehealth, HIPAA 
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product liability. In deciding between the two theories of liability, 
courts should account for the extent to which AI platforms dictate 
the course of the healthcare provided to patients. Courts ought to 
assess the standard of care to which such applications will be 
expected to adhere on a national basis. 
A more uniform adoption of existing theories of liability and 
standards of care by the courts may ensure that developers and 
healthcare providers are held more accountable for their negligent 
development and use of AI and that patients are safeguarded in the 
process. In modifying their approach to the question of liability, 
courts should remain careful not to deter developers from 
developing innovative AI platforms. The modified approach, 
however, remains sensitive to such concerns, allowing for 
safeguards that may ensure that developers are not so deterred. 
